Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 18

Number 1

Article 12

December 2019

The Modern Gold Rush - Intangible Personal Property and Escheat
Thad H. Turk

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Thad H. Turk, The Modern Gold Rush - Intangible Personal Property and Escheat, 18 WYO. L.J. 70 (1963)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol18/iss1/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

THE MODERN GOLD RUSH - INTANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY AND ESCHEAT
Escheat of unclaimed personal property through comprehensive
escheat statutes has today presented the states with an apparent pot-of-gold
lying free for the taking.' Those states without a statutory scheme of
escheating such property or with statutes which were not competitive in
this area have rushed in legislation to fill the gap. Between 1946 and
1960, twenty states passed legislation either bringing unclaimed personal
property within their statutory scheme of escheat or broadening their
existing statutes, 2 and in the eight-year period from 1954 to 1962, nine
states adopted the Uniform Disposition of Property Act to accomplish the
3
same purpose.
I
Escheat at common law was the process by which tenurial land returned
to the lord of the fee upon the occurrence of an event obstructing the
normal course of descent.4 Although a common law escheat was applicable
only to land, the concept was broadened within the common law to include
escheat of personal property located within the state5 and further broadened by legislation to include every kind of property, real and personal,
tangible and intangible, which is without an owner or whose owner has
become unknown. Today the majority of states have legislation which
purports to reach all property.0
The procedure by which escheat will be accomplished will vary from
state to state depending upon the statutory requirements set up by the
individual state. The Wyoming statutes provide three ways in which the
property may be reached. First is where the property has been unclaimed
for a period of five years and where the owner of such property has become unknown. In this case the county attorney or the attorney general
of the state may proceed by filing an information against the person, state
bank, or national bank, or corporation in possession of such property,
alleging the grounds on which the recovery is claimed and like proceedings in judgment shall be had as in a civil action for the recovery of
property. Proof that the property has been unclaimed for a period of five
years prior to the filing of the information and that the name and where1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Pennsylvania for example collected nearly $5 million from 1943-1950. Garrison,
Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 Ky. L.J. 302
(1947);
In 1953 State amended its act to make it more comprehensive so
that the "Golden Goose" could be more finely plucked. Act of 1953, July 29, P.L.
986; For a brief statement of the various State's statutory schemes, see Ely, Escheat:
Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. Law 791 (1960).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 78 (1961).
7 LEd. 139, 82 S.Ct. 199 (1961).
Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and
Washington, Book of the States, p. 105, (1962-63).
Origins and Developments of Modern Escheat, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1961);
Morton and Henderson, Survival of Certain Feudal Law Concepts in Wyoming,
2 Wyo. L.J. 91 (1947).
State v. Kearns, 79 Mont. 299, 257 Pac. 1002 (1923).
19 Am. Jur. 383.

NOTES

abouts of the owner is unknown is prima facie evidence of failure of title
7
to the property for want of legal heirs.
Second, in cases where probate proceedings have commenced upon the
estate of any person without known heirs, it is the duty of the court having
jurisdiction to distribute the unclaimed property to the state by its decree. 8
And, third, in those cases where probate has been started but has never
been completed, the county attorney or the attorney general may proceed
to recover the property as in the first situation above.0
Where the state has power of control over the "res" it has the power,
unrestricted by constitutional inhibitions, to destroy the rights, powers and
immunities of the former owner as respects that "res", even though the
state may not have jurisdiction over the person of the owner. Furthermore,
such power, when exercised in accordance with principles of "in rem"
jurisdiction, will be given full faith and credit by all sister jurisdictions, and
does not violate any constiutional rights of the owner. 10
Tangible personal property with its physical presence within the jurisdiction would clearly fall within the theory of "in rem" jurisdiction, and
escheat by the state of such property would also be given full faith and
credit by all other states so long as notice to the owner met the constitutional requirement of due process of law required by Pennoyer v. Neff."
Intangible personal property, however, is not capable of physical presence and, therefore, its "situs" within the state, from which the state acquires jurisdiction over the property, must depend upon "control over"
the property and not upon the property's location.' 2 Control has been
successfully based upon domicile of property holder's i.e., the person or
business entity which has acquired possession of the property with the right
of ownership being in some third person; last known domicile of property
owner' 4 and upon the substantial business contact theory, 5 that is, where
the transaction involving the property was carried out either in whole or
in part in the escheating state and the owner has become unknown and
was not known to be domiciled in that state, and in addition the holder
of the property is not domiciled or located within the escheating state.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

Wyoming Stat. § 9-688 (a) (1957), as amended by the session laws of 1959, ch. 168.
Wyoming Stat. § 9-688(b) (1957).
Wyoming Stat. § 9-688(b) (1957).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
Id.; Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
This theory of control grew from the difficulty encountered by the various states
in attempting to force intangible property into the rule of location as applied to
tangible property, see Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 907 (1918);
Cardozo, C.J. stated that "at the root of the selection is generally a common
sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions," the situs being a mere fiction for convenience. (Severnoe Securities Corp.
v. London and Lanchashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 174, N.E. 299 (1931).
Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Anderson Nat'l Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 833 U.S. 541 (1948).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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It is this theory of "control giving jurisdiction" which has led to the claims
of several states to the right to escheat the same property, each state basing
its "control" upon theories of the substantial business contact theory without reliance on the domicile of either the property holder or the property
owner.16
As the state asserted the above basis of jurisdiction resting upon control
over the property, property holders claimed "foul," basing their claim
upon two provisions of the federal constitution: impairment of contract in
violation of Article 1, Section 10, Clause 11" and violation of the due
process of law of the 14th Amendment. s The impairment of contract
argument was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in several cases 19 for
the reason that where there was no contractual agreement between the
property holder and the unknown property owner as to what should be
done with the property in case the owner should become unknown; thus,
there was no contract which could be impaired, and the state was merely
exercising its regulatory power over abandoned property. Ordinarily, of
course, there would be no such contractual agreement.
The due process argument was that the property holder would not
be protected from claims to the property by the property owner should
he become known, or from the claims of rival states, and therefore that
escheat would result in a taking without due process of law. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention. 20 In addition to a valid claim of jurisdiction on the part of the state, either under the theory of control or under
the substantial contact theory, the Supreme Court has required that there
be personal notice to the property holder of the claim of the state, and
notice by publication containing the name and last known residence of
the owner, where possible, or, where the owner was unknown, a description
of the property being sought to escheat. The Court has stated in each
of the cases before it that notice by publication in these cases satisfied the
requirement of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard set forth
21
in Pennoyer v. Neff

In 1951 the Supreme Court had before it Standard Oil Company v.
State of New Jersey.22 In that case, the State of New Jersey, as the state
of incorporation of the Standard Oil Company, escheated the stock and
dividends declared and unpaid thereon of owners whose whereabouts had
been unknown for fourteen consecutive years.23 The Company claimed
that the action by New Jersey violated the U.S. Constitution in both the
impairment of contracts clause and in the violation of due process clause.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

368 U.S. 71.

Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
supra note 12; Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 11.
341 U.S. 428.
N.J. Rev. Stat. 2:53 (1945-47).
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rhe Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding on the impairment
argument and then went on to reject the (ue process argument in a holding
that gave rise to what has become known as the doctrine of the "race of
diligence." 2 4 This came about as the result of the court's statement in
that case that once one state had acquired jurisdiction over the property
and had declared it escheated, the Constitution barred any "double escheat"
and such judgment in the first court would have to be given full faith and
25
credit by every other interested state thereafter.
Relying on the above opinion of the Supreme Court, the State of
Pennsylvania, in 1953, began proceedings to escheat money deposited with
che Western Union Telegraph Company for money orders purchased in
Pennsylvania and unclaimed by either the sender or the recipient for a
period of seven years. On July 6, 1959, the state court found for the Commonwealth in the sum of $39,857.74.26

This case had a distinguishing factor. In none of the earlier cases had
another state made any claim to the money involved at the time of the
action or previous thereto. But here, the State of New York, basing its
jurisdiction on the fact that the company was incorporated in New York,
had, prior to the Pennsylvania judgment, escheated a part of the funds held
in Pennsylvania. Upon appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the
company argued that New York would not be bound by the Pennsylvania
judgment and could escheat these same funds, thereby causing a double
escheat which would violate the due process clause. The New Jersey
Court rejected this argument, relying upon the Standard Oil case, and
stated "nor would Western Union need fear that the moneys here involved
would be subject to double escheat in New York ....

The decree of escheat

here affirmed is naturally subject to the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution ...

"27

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court.
It stated that the escheat by Pennsylvania need not be given full faith and
credit by the other states with claims against the property, because such
states had not been and could not be made a party in state action . Thus
the Pennsylvania judgment would result in deprivation of due process
of law, because Western Union would be compelled to relinquish its property without assurance that it would not be held liable again in another
24.

341 U.S. 443, 444, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent created this label.

dissenting
interested
be bound
faith and

The

Justices, Frankfuter, Jackson, Douglas and Black, felt that because other
states had not been made party to the action that such states would not
by New Jersey's escheat judgment and would not need to give it full
credit, as the mapority held.

25.

Id.

26.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d

27.

617 (1960).
Id. at 622; Id. at 621.

The Court stated "the core of the debtor obligations of the

plaintiff companies was created through acts (lone in this state . . . and the ties
thereby established between the companies and the State were without more
sufficient to validate the jurisdiction here asserted..
thus basing its jurisdiction
upon the substantial contact theory.
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jurisdiction, or in a suit
brought about by a claimant who was not bound
2
by the first judgment. 8
The Court distinguished the previous holding in the Standard Oil
Case, quoting the previous case:
The claim of no other state to this property is before us and, of
course, determination of any right of a claimant state against
New Jersey for property
escheated by New Jersey must await
29
presentation here.
In the Standard Oil Case, the State of New York had claimed the property
but not prior to New Jersey's escheat of the same property.
The race of diligence then is not dead; but did it ever evist? The
statements of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case cause doubt as
to whether it did: ".

.

. determination of any right of a claimant state

against New Jersey for property escheated by New Jersey must await presentation here." 30 And in the Western Union Case, ". . . for a state court
judgment need not be given full faith and credit by other states as to
parties or property not subject to the jurisdiction of the court that rendered it."'

1

It appears that the dissent in the Standard Oil case, suggesting that
only a custodial statute whereby the state acquired custory and possession
of the property in perpetuity with a reserved right in the property owner
to claim the property at any future date upon proof of his right of ownership would be constitutional, takes the soundest practical position as a
matter of reality in this area. 3- The state may race to acquire the property from the holder, but if the action is not brought in the U.S, Supreme
Court, any state with a prior claim against the property is not bound by
it and, therefore, may proceed to escheat the same property from the holder
in violation of the due process of law. If, on the other hand, the state
escheated property to which some other state subsequently raised a claim,
such subsequent claimant could proceed in the U.S. Supreme Court and,
upon proof of a superior claim, acquire the property regardless of the action
in the first state. Thus, no state's claim to escheat intangible personal
property will be final until there has been a determination by the Supreme
Court.
If the race of diligence does continue to have force, it will do so not
as a matter of law but as a mere matter of impossibility; the impossibility
of requiring the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction in this
area, 33 and the impossibility of the Supreme Court hearing all of the claims
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

368 U.S. at 75.
368 U.S. at 76.
341 U.S. at 443.
368 U.S. at 444.
Supra note 22.
In the Western Union case, 368 U.S. at 79, the Court stated that two avenues were
open to the states: I. Through an original action before the Supreme Court where
all interested states could-be joined as in Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 405 (1939) ;
or 2. By referral of the action to a United States.District Court as in Massachusetts
v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939).
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which are likely to be presented to it for determination because of the
34
burden which it is presently under.
Realizing the possibility that it could not hear all of these cases, the
Supreme Court in the Western Union case presented an alternative-of
referral of the cases to the District Courts as in Massachusetts v. Missouri.
However, this may be of no value because of the Eleventh Amendment
which would prevent the possibility of any interested state from being interpleaded as a party to the action in the District Court under Rule 22 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 5 Where it was not possible to join
all of the interested states in the District Court, the same shortcoming of
not being able to give the property holder the assurance that a state
would not make a claim for the property in another proceeding would be
raised and would, as in the l'Vestern Union case, amount to the first escheat
action being a violation of due process of law.
II
What then of Wyoming? In 1959, this state broadened the statute in
this area so it would be fully effective under existing doctrines,35 but after
this legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court had before it the Western Union
case and as the result of the holding in that case all the legislation which
relied on the earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court has been placed
in doubt.
Wyoming's scheme of escheat is found in three statutes, two of which
have remained unchanged since their first enactment into law in 1899.31
The fact that these two have remained unchanged for so long a period of
time, during which the law of escheat of intangibles was being developed,
is because the statutes were and are so broad as to apply to any kind of
property. 3s

But these two statutes, by themselves, would be constitutionally

insufficient to allow Wyoming to escheat unclaimed intangible personal
property in that they make no provision for notice to either the property
holder or the property owner. The third statute, 39 from the time of the
original passage, has always dealt specifically with all unclaimed property
of unknown owners. The legislature, following the growth in the area
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

"The Court has something better to do than survey all the wanderings of migratory
millionaires," Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 Yale L.J.
377 (1940).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 (1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined
as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground
for objection to the joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles
on which their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical
but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that
he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or
counterclaim.
Wyo. Stat. § 9-688 (1957), as amended by the Session Laws of 1959, ch. 168.
Wyo. Stat. §§ 9-686 and 9-687 (1957).
In 1923 the State of Montana interpreted a nearly indentical statute to be broad
enough to escheat unclaimed bank deposits. State v. Kearns, supra note 5.
Wyo. Stat. supra note 4.
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of intangibles and the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, has kept the
operation of the statute constitutional and broad so as to remain competitive. Prior to the Western Union case, Wyoming was in a favorable position from which to compete in the "race of diligence", 40 but the Western
Union case, as stated previously, has now placed the theory upon which
the statutory growth was based in serious doubt. As a result of this doubt,
the solution to the problem must come from a joint effort on the part of
all the states of self help in the form of reasonable rules as to which claimant
state shall have the superior right to the property, in the many and varied
areas from which the claims may arise. This could well be the subject of
an interstate compact, or other form of interstate agreement.
Another solution is presented by the Commissioners on Uniform State
41
Laws in the form of the Uniform Dsiposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
This act is built upon three premises which have allowed it to become
more attractive as a result of the Western Union case than it had been
prior to that case, at least so far as Wyoming is concerned. The first premise is that it is not an escheat statute but is custodial; the second is that it
was drawn up with the idea in mind that the "race of diligence" was to be
avoided; and third is the general desirability of symmetry in the law for the
benefit of persons doing business in more than one state which is found
in all the Uniform Acts.
42
The prefatory note to the Act best states the purpose of the Act:

The Uniform Act is custodial in nature,-that is to say, it does not
result in the loss of the owner's property rights. The state takes
custody and remains the custodian in perpetuity. Although the
actual possibility of his presenting a claim in the distant future
is not great, the owner retains the right of presenting his claim at
any time no matter how remote. State records will have to be kept
on a permanent basis. In this respect the measure differs from the
escheat type of statute, pursuant to which the right of the owner
is foreclosed and the title to the property passes to the state. Not
only does the custodial type statute more adequately preserve the
owner's interests, but, in addition, it makes possible a substantial
simplification of procedure.
The Act, which consists of thirty-two sections, commences with
the usual section of definitions. This is followed by Sections 2
through 9 devoted to defining and describing the circumstances
under which various classes of property are to be presumed abandoned under the Act. Separate sections deal with property held
or owing by banks or other financial organizations, insurance cor40.

41.
42.

Id.,
(1)
(2)
(3)

The important provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 9-688 (1957) are that:
it applies to property of "whatsoever character";
which has been unclaimed for a period of five years;
notice is provided for by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (d) upon
the holder, and by 4 (e) (3) by publication upon the unknown claimant; and
(4) the property may be recovered by the owner at any time for a further. period
of five years after the state acquires custody of it.
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
pp. 136-153 (Hereafter cited Act) (1954).
Act. Supra pp. 136-137.

NOTES

porations, public utilities, other business associations, trustees in
corporate dissolution proceedings, fiduciaries, and state courts and
other public agencies. Section 9 is an omnibus section covering
all other items held on owing "in the ordinary course of the
holder's business." Thereafter comes Section 10, which may be regarded as a key section in the Act, for it contains the provisions
which preclude the possibility of multiple liability being imposed
upon the holder of unclaimed property who happens to be subject
to the jurisdiction of two or more states. The remaining sections,
11 through 32, deal principally with procedural matters, including
the reporting of unclaimed property, the giving of a notice to
owners, payment into the custody of the state and various provisions pursuant to which the owner may subsequently present his
claim to the state and recover his property.
Prior to setting out Section 10 of the above Act, it might be well to
note that as Wyoming's statute now stands, it is custodial for a period of
five years43 and except for the dissent in the Standard Oil case to the
effect that only a custodial statute would be constitutional, there appears
to be no compelling reason for the custodial period to extend beyond the
five-year period, but the Uniform Act has the added advantage of not requiring custody to be based on a judicial escheat action, as would be
necessary to vest the state with absolute title to the property after the
44
running of the custodial period.
Section 10 of the Act provides:
If specific property which is subject to the provisions of Sections
2, 5, 6, 7, and 9, is held for or owed or distributable to an owner
whose last known address is in another state by a holder who is
subject to the jurisdiction of that state, the specific property is not
presumed abandoned in this state and subject to this act if:
(a) it may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the
laws of another state; and
(b) the laws of such other state make reciprocal provision
that similar specific property is not presumed abandoned
or escheatable by such other state when held for or owed
or distributable to an owner whose last known address
is within this state by a holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of this state.
In addition to preventing multiple state claims to the property
through the reciprocity feature of Section 10, the Uniform Act would
have the added advantage of adding to Wyoming's law the necessity for
the holders of property assumed abandoned to report such property to
the State Treasurer 45r and to pay such sums to the state without the necessity of a judicial escheat or forfeiture determination, the state assuming
any liability to the owner thereof. Thus the state would acquire the property absolutely, subject to a continuing liability to the owner. Presumably,
43.
44.
45.

Op. Cit. note 35.
Act, supra pp. 144-145.
Act, supra 11 at 145.

78
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money could be invested and the income would be the unconditional property of the state. And, as stated previously, the Act overcomes the "race
of diligence" concept if it still exists, or if such concept has no vitality, the
Act will, through its reciprocity feature, give the states the assurance of
not being faced with the uncertainty of an action before the U.S. Supreme
Court or a U.S. District Court and not knowing which of several claimant
states will be considered to have the superior right to the property.
THAD

H.

TURK

